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ABSTRACT 
Dynamic ID based authentication scheme is more and more important in insecure wireless 
environment and system. Two of kinds of attack that authentication schemes must resist are 
stealing identity and reflection attack which is a potential way of attacking a challenge- response 
authentication system using the same protocol in both directions. It must be guaranteed to 
prevent attackers from reusing information from authentication phase and the scheme of Yoon 
and Yoo satisfies those requirements. However, their scheme can not resist insider and 
impersonation attack by using lost or stolen smart card. In this paper, we demonstrate that Yoon 
and Yoo’s scheme is still vulnerable to those attacks. Then, we present an improvement to their 
scheme in order to isolate such problems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Communication in network environment is more and more popular. In such insecure 
environments, especially wireless networks, remote authentication schemes play an important 
role in communicating between parties. There are many approaches, but one of remarkable 
solutions is biometrics-based method [1, 2, 3, 4]. Furthermore, many schemes also use elliptic 
curve to increase security of protocols [5, 6, 7]. However, all these schemes use operations 
which cost too much such as biometric-algorithm, scalar multiply point or addition point [8]. So, 
authentication scheme which is based on passwords is considered simple, efficient, and 
convenient way allowing a legal user to login to remote server securely. There are many papers 
proposing various ideas to improve password authentication schemes for safe login of legal users 
[9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. Nevertheless, all these schemes employ static login ID, which is easy for 
adversaries to steal some information about a user’s login message. One solution to ID-theft is to 
generate different ID of users for each login [14, 15, 16]. 
 






In 2005, Liao et al. [15] proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme 
using smart cards. In this scheme, Liao et al achieved fixing problems existing in Das et al [14] 
with low cost successfully. Moreover, their scheme also inherits advantages from Das et al [14]. 
In 2006, E. J. Yoon and K. Y. Yoo [16], however, showed that Liao et al.’s scheme has 
three security weaknesses as follow: It can not protect against reflection attack. In addition, it 
can not protect against insider attack. Finally, it cannot protect against impersonation attack by 
using lost or stolen smart card. E. J. Yoon and K. Y. Yoo proposed a slight modification of Liao 
et al.’s scheme. They claimed that their proposed scheme not only inherits Liao et al.’s 
advantages but it also enhances Liao et al.’s security by removing the security weaknesses. In 
2010, Tsai et al. [17] pointed weak points of Yoon’s scheme. However, their solution employs 
modular exponentiation which costs too much. Furthermore, timestamp based on two-way 
authentication can not achieve explicit key confirmation [18, 19]. 
With above analyses, we will re-prove Yoon’s scheme is still vulnerable to a privileged 
insider’s attack and impersonation attacks by using lost or stolen smart card with different 
solution. Our main ideas are using a random value for each user instead of providing the same 
key for all and three-way challenge-response handshake technique to resist replay attack better 
[19]. Then, we present an improvement to the scheme to resist problems existing in Yoon’s 
scheme. 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 quickly reviews and discusses weaknesses of 
E. J. Yoon and K. Y. Yoo’s improving the dynamic ID-based remote authentication scheme. Our 
proposed scheme is presented in section 3, while section 4 discusses the security and efficiency 
of the proposed scheme. Our conclusions are presented in section 5. 
2. REVIEW AND CRYPTANALYSIS OF EUN-JUN YOON AND KEE-YOUNG YOO’S 
SCHEME 
In this section, we review Yoon and Yoo’s Improving the dynamic ID-based remote mutual 
authentication scheme[16] and show that their authentication scheme is vulnerable to insider 
attack, and impersonation attack with lost or stolen smart card. Before continuing to the main 
part, we reuse some of the notations used in Yoon and Yoo’s paper: 
 U: The user 
 PW: The password of U 
 S: The remote system 
 x: The secret key of S 
 y: The secret number of S stored in each user’s smart card 
 T: A time-stamp 
 h(.): A one-way hash function 
  : Bit-wise XOR operation 
 
 







 ‖ : Concatenation 
2.1. Review of Eun-Jun Yoon and Kee-Young Yoo’s scheme 
Yoon and Yoo’s scheme includes two phases: a registration phase and an authentication 
phase. Figure 1 shows Yoon and Yoo’s authentication scheme. The scheme works as follows: 
Registration Phase: When a new user U wants to register with the remote system S, he/she 
performs this phase only once. S will issue a smart card to U after this phase is done. The steps 
are as follows: 
1. U freely chooses a password PW and computes ( )h PW R‖ , where R is randomly 
chosen nonce by U. He/she submits his/her identity ID and ( )h PW R‖  to S through a 
secure channel. 
2. S then computes ( ) ( )N h PW R h ID x ‖ ‖  and ( ) ( )K h PW R h N y ‖ ‖ . 
3. S stores ( , , , (.))N y K h  into a smart card and then sends the smart card to U through a 
secure channel. 
4. U enters R into his/her smart card. 
In their registration phase, we see that there are two advantages: another user can choose 
password PW and identity ID freely. Furthermore, user also can hide his/her password from 
server by sending a hash value ( )h PW R‖  instead of only PW and at this point, our scheme 
proposed later completely inherits them. However, due to preparation for our authentication 
scheme, we only modify our registration phase a little bit by adding a random value e for each 
user’s registration. 
Authentication Phase: In this phase, when U wants to login S, S can authenticate U. The 
steps of this phase are as follows: 
1. U inserts his/her smart card into the card reader of a terminal, and keys in his/her PW 
Then, the smart card computes ( )h PW R‖  and extracts ( )h N y‖  by computing 
( )K h PW R ‖ . The smart card computes ( )h N y‖  by using stored N and y, and 
compares it with extracted hash value ( )h N y‖ . If it is equal, the smart card computes 
a dynamic ID as ( ) ( )CID h PW R h N y T ‖ ‖ ‖ , ( ( ))B h CID h PW R ‖ ‖ , 
( )C h T N B y ‖ ‖ ‖ , where T is a time-stamp. 
2. U sends ( , , , )CID N C T  to S. 
3. Upon receiving the login request at the time T’, S verifies if whether ( ' )T T T   . If 
it holds, S accepts the login request of U, where T  is an expected valid time interval. 
Then, S computes ( ) ( )h PW R CID h N y T ‖ ‖ ‖ ,  ( ( ))B h CID h PW R ‖ ‖ , and 
 






checks if ( )C h T N B y ‖ ‖ ‖ . If it holds, S allows U to login to the system. 
Otherwise, S rejects it. Then S computes 
*( )D h T B y ‖ ‖ , where *T  is a time-stamp. 
 
Figure 1. Yoon And Yoo Authetication Scheme 
4. S sends 
*( ,  )D T  to U. 
5. Upon receiving the reply message at the time T”, U verifies whether 
*( " )T T T   , 
where T  is an expected valid time interval. If it holds, U computes *( )h T B y‖ ‖  and 
compares it with the received D. If it holds, U can be sure that she/he is communicating 
with the actual S. 
Due to using the same key y provided by server S, adversaries easily uses their key y to 
know ( )h PW R‖  of any legal users by decrypting CID which belongs to package (CID, N, C, 
T) transmitted from another user. With ( )h PW R‖ , adversaries can do anything which is 
analysed in below section to harm user and server. 
2.2. Cryptanalysis of Yoon and Yoo’s Scheme 
 
 







In this section, we show that Yoon and Yoo’s authentication scheme is vulnerable to insider 
attack, and impersonation attack with lost or stolen smart card. 
Insider Attack: In paper [16], we see that any legal user can fake S. If an attacker is a legal 
user, he/she will have y. So, when other users send (CID, N, C, T), he/she can catch this package. 
Then, he or she can compute ( ) ( )h PW R CID h N y T ‖ ‖ ‖ , 
( ( ))B h CID h PW R ‖ ‖ . With B, he/she continues to compute *( )D h T B y ‖ ‖ , where 
timestamp 
*T  is generated by his/herself. Clearly, package *( ,  )D T  is legal and it can cheat 
any legal user that user is communicating with S. 
Impersonation Attack by Using Lost or Stolen Smart Card: In paper the authors 
mention that this protocol can resist lost or stolen smart card. It is not true because we can 
demonstrate that if anyone is stolen information of smart card, that user will be impersonated. 
For example, attacker has ( , , , (.))N y K h  of U. He/she will have by performing ( )K h N y ‖ . 
With ( )h PW R‖ , the attacker can compute ( ) ( )CID h PW R h N y T ‖ ‖ ‖ , 
( ( ))B h CID h PW R ‖ ‖  and ( )C h T N B y ‖ ‖ ‖ . Finally, attacker sends (CID, N, C, T) 
and he/she impersonates U successfully. 
3. PROPOSED SCHEME 
In this section, we propose an enhancement to Yoon and Yoo’s scheme that removes the 
security problems described in the previous section. Our improved scheme not only inherits the 
advantages of their scheme, it also enhances the security of their scheme. Our scheme is also 
divided into the two phases of registration and authentication. To resist such attacks, the 
proposed phases perform as follows: 
3.1. Registration phase 
Before we continue to present, we list three requirements for a registration phase: secrecy 
for information transmitted between user and server, the true password of user should not shown 
to anyone even the server, and difference between keys provided for each time of registration by 
server. Easily, we see that Yoon and Yoo’s scheme achieved first two requirements but not the 
last. So, we will recover this point to accomplish a good registration phase. 
When a new user U wants to register with the remote system S, he/she performs this phase 
only one time. S will issue a smart card to U after this phase is finished. Figure 2 illustrates the 
steps of this phase. 
1. U freely chooses ID and password PW. Then U computes ( )h PW R‖ , where R is 
randomly chosen nonce by U. U submits U’s identity ID and ( )h PW R‖  to S through a 
secure channel. 
 






2. Afterward, server S continues to compute ( ) ( ) ( )N h PW R h ID h x e  ‖ ‖ , 
( ( ) ( ( )))L h h PW R h N h y e ‖ ‖ ‖  and ( ) ( ) ( )E h PW R h ID h y e  ‖ ‖ , where 
e is randomly chosen nonce by S. 
3. S stores (N, L, E, e) into a smart card and then sends the smart card to U through a secure 
channel. 
4. U enters R into his/her smart card. 
 
Figure 2. Proposed Registration Phase 
In our registration phase, we see that the main difference is a random value e generated by 
server S. With this value, S can provide each user with two keys ( )h x e‖  and ( )h y e‖ , which is 
not the same at different time. 
3.2. Authentication Phase 
Similarly, we also propose three requirements that help authentication be more secure: user 
must use a random value to challenge server, server must use a random value to challenge user. 
And user and server share a secret session key. In Yoon and Yoo’s scheme, only user uses time-
stamp instead of random value to challenge server but not vice versa and no session key is 
generate after authenticating successfully. Our phase will fix these weak points. In this phase, 
when U wants to login S, S can authenticate U. Figure 3 illustrates the steps of this phase. 
1. U inserts U’s smart card into the card reader of a terminal, and types in U’s PW and ID. 
Then the smart card computes 1 ( )H h PW R ‖  and 2 ( )H h ID . Then smart card 
computes 
1 2( )h y e E H H  ‖ . Then smart card continues to compute 
*
1( ( ( )))L h H h N h y e  ‖ ‖  and compares 
*L  to L stored in smart card. If it is equal, 
the smart card computes a dynamic ID as 2 1( ( ) )CID H h N h y e T  ‖ ‖ ‖ , where T1 
is a random value chosen by U, 1( )B h CID H ‖  and 1( ( ))C h T N B h y e ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ . 
2. U sends (CID, N, T1, C, e) to S. 
 
 







3. On receiving the login request, S computes 
1( ) ( ( ) )h ID CID h N h y e T  ‖ ‖ ‖ , 
( ) ( ) ( )h PW R h x e N h ID  ‖ ‖ . Then S computes * ( ( ))B h CID h PW R ‖ ‖  
and 
* *
1( ( ))C h T N B h y e ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ . Finally S checks if 
*C C . If it holds, S allows U 
to login the system. Otherwise, S rejects it. Then S computes 
*
2( ( ))D h T B h x e ‖ ‖ ‖ , 
where T2 is a random value chosen by S. 
4. S sends (D, T2 ) to U. 
5. On receiving the login request, U computes  
1 2( )h x e N H H  ‖  and 
*
2( ( ))D h T B h x e ‖ ‖ ‖ . Then U verifies whether 
*D D . If it holds, U computes 
hash value  1 1 2 2( )M h H H B T ‖ ‖ ‖  and session key 1 2 2 1( )SK h H H B T T ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ . 
Then U sends M1 to S. 
6. On receiving M1, S computes 
* *
2( ( ) ( ) )M h h PW R h ID B T ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖  and checks if 
*
1M M . If it is not equal, S terminates the session. Otherwise, S computes session 
key 
*
2 1( ( ) ( ) )SK h h PW R h ID B T T ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ . 
 
Figure 3. Proposed authentication phase 
 






Because of using a random value is better time-stamp value [19], we use random values on 
two user and server sides in our authentication phase to make phase more fair and secure. 
Moreover, after this phase, user and server share a session key SK to encrypt data later. 
4. SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we review weak points and strong points of our scheme and analyze it on 
two aspects: security and efficiency. Our scheme includes two phases, registration and 
authentication phases. 
 Registration phase: User U sends ( , ( ))ID h PW R‖  to server S and U receives (N, L, E, 
e). Finally, U enters R into smart card. The advantage of this phase is user will receive 
smart card with different information at different time, and the drawback is PW chosen 
by U. That PW may be a weak password [20], which has a value of low entropy and can 
be guessed in polynomial time. 
 Authentication phase: At first, U challenges S by sending (CID, N, T1, C, e) to S. Then, S 
re-challenges by sending (D, T2) to U. And finally, U confirm S by sending M1 to S. 
After authenticating successfully, S and U share the same session key SK. The advantage 
of this our phase is all information depend on master key x and y, a strong key [20] of S, 
which has a value of high entropy and can not be guessed in polynomial time. And the 
drawback of this our phase is using more hash operation than previous ones. 
4.1. Security Analysis 
In this section, we present security analyses. Table 1 lists the functionality comparisons 
between our improved scheme and others. It can be seen that functionality comparisons of our 
improved scheme is more secure against various attacks. 
Insider attacks: Unlike Yoon and Yoo’s authentication scheme, any legal user can fake S. 
Our scheme bases x and y that only belong to S. So, attacker can not fake S to cheat other users. 
For example, if attacker A wants to fake S, A must compute D. So, A must have B of user and x 
of S to achieve D. Clearly, A has no way to compute D to fake S to cheat user. So, our scheme 
resists insider attacks. 
Impersonation attacks with a lost or stolen smart card: With information in smart card, 
attacker cannot compute ( )h y e‖  to fake user. If attacker A wants to have ( )h y e‖ , A must 
have ID and PW to compute ( ) ( )h PW R h ID E ‖  to get ( )h y e‖ . It is obvious that A has 
no way to have ID and PW of user. So, our scheme resists impersonation attacks with a lost or 
stolen smart card. 
Replay attacks: If attacker uses old login message (CID, N, T1, C, e) to cheat S, he/she will 
fail at step 5 due to not having B, ( )h PW R‖  and h(ID) to compute M1 to cheat S. So, our 
scheme resists replay attacks. 
 
 







Known-key attacks: Known-key attacks mean that compromise of a past session key 
cannot derive any further session key. In our scheme, the session key SK is associated with B, 
h(ID) and ( )h PW R‖ , which are unknown to the adversary. Even though the past session key 
SK is disclosed, the attacker cannot know B, h(ID) and ( )h PW R‖ . Thus, the attacker can not 
obtain any further session key. 
Achieving mutual authentication and session key agreement: In our scheme, firstly the 
user authenticates the server and then server authenticates the user with three-way challenge-
response handshake technique. After mutual authentication, the user and server share the 
common session key to encrypt messages later. In our scheme, server sends (D, T2) to user after 
receiving (CID, N, T1, C, e) from user. Then user authenticates server by checking the condi-
tion
*D D . Afterward, user sends M1 to server and server authenticates user by 
checking
*
1M M . Therefore, the mutual authentication and session key agreement are 
performed securely in our scheme. 
Password guessing attacks: Like Yoon and Yoo’s scheme, our scheme bases PW and R. 
Even attacker can guess PW of U, she/he can not login S without random R. So our scheme can 
resist guessing attacks. In addtion to attacks above, our scheme also achieves three properties 
that belong to previous schemes, user’s anonymity, reflection attack and no verification table. 
Table 1. The functionality comparison between our scheme and the others 
 Liao et al [15] Yoon and Yoo [16] Ours 
Insider attack No No Yes 
Impersonation attack No No Yes 
Known-key attack No No Yes 
Mutual authentication No Yes Yes 
Session key exchange No No Yes 
User anonymity Yes Yes Yes 
Replay attack No Yes Yes 
No verification table Yes Yes Yes 
Reflection attack No Yes Yes 
4.2. Efficiency Analysis 
To compare efficiency between our scheme and the two previous ones proposed by Liao et 
al and Yoon and Yoo, we reuse approach used in those previous schemes to analyze 
computational complexity. That is, we calculate the number of one-way hash function execution. 
 






Let Th be the time to compute one-way hash function. 
In Liao et al’s scheme, U needs 1  Th for h(PW) and S needs 1  Th for N in registration 
phase. In authentication phase, U needs 2  Th for CID, 1  Th for B, and 1  Th for C. U checks 
D that needs 1  Th. In the same phase, S computes ( )CID h N y T    that needs 1  Th, 
computes B needs 1  Th, computes ( )h T N B y    that needs 1  Th, and computes 
*( )h T N B y    needs 1  Th. 
In Yoon and Yoo’s scheme, U computes ( )h PW R‖  that needs 1  Th and S computes N 
and K that need 2  Th in registration phase. In authentication phase of Yoon and Yoo’s scheme, 
U computes ( )h N y‖  that needs 1  Th, ( )h PW R‖  needs 1  Th, CID needs 1  Th, computes 
B that needs 1  Th, and computes C that needs 1  Th. U checks D needs 1  Th. In the same 
phase, S computes ( )h N y T‖ ‖  that needs 1  Th, B needs 1  Th, computes ( )h T N B y‖ ‖ ‖  
that needs 1  Th, and computes 
*( )h T B y‖ ‖  that needs 1  Th. 
In our scheme, U computes ( )h PW R‖  that needs 1  Th and S computes N, L and E that 
need 5  Th in registration phase. In authentication phase of our scheme, U computes ( )h y e‖  
that needs 2  Th, 
*L  that needs 2  Th, CID that needs 1  Th, B that needs 1  Th and C that 
needs 1  Th. U checks D needs 1  Th and computes M1 that needs 1  Th. In the same phase, S 
computes h(ID) that needs 2  Th, ( )h PW R‖  that needs 1  Th, B that needs 1  Th and 
*C  that 
needs 1  Th. S computes D that needs 1  Th and checks M1 that needs 1  Th. 
We can see that the number of hash operation in our registration phase needs more three 
times than Yoon and Yoo’s. However, registration phase is performed one time for each user. 
And our authentication scheme needs more six times than Yoon and Yoo’s. Nevertheless, this 
increase is necessary to enhance security stronger than previous schemes. 
Table 2. A comparision of computation costs 
Computational type Liao et al[15] Yoon and Yoo[16] Ours 
Registration Phase 2  Th 3  Th 6  Th 
Authentication Phase 9  Th 10  Th 16  Th 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we review dynamic ID-based remote mutual authentication scheme of Yoon 
and Yoo. Although their scheme is secure against reflection attack, we see that their scheme is 
vulnerable to insider, impersonation by using stolen smart card attacks. So, we propose an 
improved scheme to eliminate such problems. Compared with related schemes, the proposed 
scheme has the following main advantages; (1) User can choose the password freely. (2) It 
provides secure user anonymity. (3) It does not hold the password verification table for users. (4) 
 
 







It provides mutual authentication and session key agreement. As a result, the proposed scheme is 
able to provide greater security and be practical in wireless communication systems. 
In the future, however, we will study a remote mutual authentication scheme on elliptic 
curve cryptosystem (ECC) using smart card to enhance security more and apply to more 
applications in electronic transactions. 
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